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Abstract: Flood is the most frequently occurring natural disaster, making up 49% of disasters and 43% of 12 
disaster related deaths globally in 2019. Exacerbating this situation, due to increased urbanization, the 13 
number of people living in precarious and flooding prone areas is increasing. In order to counter these 14 
challenges, the flood risk management narrative is evolving towards integration of blue/green infrastructure 15 
(BGI) through projects that harness nature and mimic natural processes, into the wider approach of an 16 
integrated water and land management. However, there is very little research into how BGI-related 17 
innovations will be funded. This gap in knowledge has multiple significance. Firstly, there is an immediate 18 
need to pay for such flood risk management measures across the world. Secondly, this financial imperative 19 
takes place against an international backdrop of reduced government funding. Thirdly, land management 20 
carries deep distributive-justice implications especially relevant in integrated catchment-based flood risk 21 
management. In order to reflect upon this situation, this paper investigates the role of Land Value Capture 22 
(LVC) instruments in financing Blue/green Infrastructure. This research focuses on Transferable 23 
Development Rights (TDR) instrument, which has enabled some planning authorities in the global north 24 
and south to successfully adopt preventive measures in flooding prone areas. Findings from literature 25 
review suggest that BGI have a positive impact on land markets by means of providing open spaces, 26 
improved landscapes and increasing the quality of urban environment. TDR with an emphasis on land 27 
conservation, can be an attractive instrument in terms of cross-subsidizing property windfalls of the 28 
properties benefiting from BGI and property blights of the landowners in properties where development 29 
shall be frozen to provide BGI. Yet, the success of TDR is closely linked to the specific legal, market and 30 
urban development contexts, which further research should explore within the framework BGI 31 
implementation. 32 
 33 
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1. Introduction 2 
Flood is the most frequently occurring natural disaster, with an annual global average1 of 153 disasters, 3 
73.1 million affected people and the costliest natural disaster (Dano et al., 2019), in terms of economic 4 
and ecologic losses, with yearly estimated economic losses of $36.3 billion (CRED, 2019). In 2019 floods 5 
made up 49% of disasters and 43% of disaster related deaths globally (CRED, 2020). Flooding is one of 6 
the most frequent disasters and it is affecting an ever-increasing number of people and livelihoods in 7 
parallel with soaring urbanization trends. In order to counter these challenges, the flood risk management 8 
narrative is evolving towards the integration of blue/green infrastructure (BGI) with more traditional 9 
engineering solutions. Blue/green infrastructure is defined as "strategically planned network of natural 10 
and semi-natural areas with other environmental features designed and managed to deliver a wide range 11 
of ecosystem services" (European Commission, 2013, p. 3). Nevertheless, comprehensive considerations 12 
on land, taking into account the biophysical integral of natural and anthropogenic processes, are still 13 
lacking (Schanze, 2019). Seeking to contribute to a more comprehensive approach to land management in 14 
the realm of Flood Risk Management (FRM), this paper evaluates Land Value Capture (LVC) 15 
instruments' potential to facilitate the implementation of BGI, focusing on Transferable Development 16 
Rights. Land Value Capture is based on the idea that the value of land is created by society and not linked 17 
to its landowner’s actions (which can increase the value of the improvements on land such as buildings, 18 
but not the value of land itself) and should therefore, in part or entirely, be reaped for the public 19 
(Alterman, 2012; Smolka, 2013; Walters, 2016). Transferable development rights (TDR) (or air 20 
rights/density transfer/purchase of development rights) is an instrument that falls under the LVC 21 
instruments implemented to address sustainable and environmentally resilient development through land 22 
conservation. The underlying research question that guides this paper is: What is the potential for 23 
Transferable Development Rights to facilitate the implementation of BGI based flood risk management 24 
measures?  25 
In contrast to other types of infrastructure, research on how the implementation of BGI can be facilitated 26 
and funded is still in its early stages, with a few studies exploring alternatives of implementing Nature 27 
Based Solutions2 on private property (Hartmann, Slavikova and McCarthy, 2019; Schanze, 2019). Also, 28 
the implementation of BGI has been surprisingly slow, considering the multiple benefits that such 29 
infrastructure can offer. Arguably this is due to higher requirements in land availability and maintenance 30 
 
1 Estimated over 2008-2017 period 




costs (van Vuren, Paarlberg and Havinga, 2015), and most pertinently for this article, the complexity of 1 
unpicking and mediating the complex politics of land ownership, value and benefit. Thus, investigating 2 
practical ways of facilitating the implementation of BGI is of high relevance. Firstly, there is an 3 
immediate need to respond to the emergency of flood risk internationally with more sustainable solutions. 4 
Secondly, the funding imperative takes place against a backdrop of reduced government funding in many 5 
developing as well as developed countries, such as UK (Clean Water America Alliance, 2012; Keeley et 6 
al., 2013; Matthews, Lo and Byrne, 2015; Wright, 2016; Mell, 2020). Thirdly, land management carries 7 
deep distributive-justice implications (Alterman, 2012), especially relevant in integrated catchment-based 8 
flood risk management. This situation reveals overlapping questions around practical solutions, methods 9 
of funding, how asset owners and communities will be affected and who benefits and who pays for the 10 
intervention. With good reason, Hartmann (2016)refers to floodplains as contested land. 11 
In order to explore the linkages between flood risk management and equitable funding, the paper 12 
combines literature and research traditionally considered in isolation. That of climate change, justice, 13 
urbanisation, flood risk management, governmental funding and land value capture. This novel reflection 14 
in literature is the methodological underpinning of the paper. The remainder of this paper is structured in 15 
the following way. The next section briefly explains BGI within the wider context of flood risk 16 
management, considering implementation challenges with a primary focus on land availability and 17 
equitable funding. Here the relationship between land (markets), flooding and flood risk management 18 
techniques is discussed. This is in order to reveal the potential for the inherent value built up in land to 19 
help fund flood risk management. The paper then focuses on how this value can be fairly captured 20 
through methods of LVC, focusing on the little considered TDR programs. The paper concludes by 21 
reflecting back upon the underlying research question and setting out a research agenda for future study.   22 
2. Flood Risk Management, Blue/green Infrastructure and Land Markets 23 
2.1. Integrating BGI in FRM 24 
There is now a consensus amongst researchers and practitioners that higher levees and grey protective 25 
infrastructure alone will not resolve the future flood protection needs of society. Perversely it might 26 
contribute to higher vulnerability towards disasters from unpredicted and extreme weather events 27 
(Brookes, Gregory and Dawson, 1983; Green, Parker and Tunstall, 2000; Hartmann, 2016). Recognizing 28 
the limitations of FRM practices applied, the battle against water narrative has started shifting to an 29 
alternative approach of using BGI to accommodate water (European Parliament and Council of the 30 
European Union, 2007; European Commission, 2013). Hartmann, Slavikova and McCarthy (2019) 31 
explain that in terms of flood risk management, BGI can vary in form, including Natural Water Retention 32 
Measures (NWRM), space for rivers or other measures that can contribute to more resilient urban areas 33 
such as green roofs and decentralized rainwater management.  34 
The integration of BGI in urban areas provides many advantages, such as integrating urban green with 35 
other urban infrastructures and multifunctional benefits, serving not only its infrastructural purpose but 36 
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also an ecological, social and economic role. Additionally, BGI contributes to retain and utilize 1 
stormwater as a vital source as we face more uncertain climate (O’Donnell et al., 2020). Due to its 2 
multifunctional properties, BGI is considered to be more efficient in handling complexity in an urban 3 
setting in comparison to more traditional infrastructure (Hansen and Pauleit, 2014). 4 
Nevertheless, while BGI has attracted a lot of attention, guidelines about it have by far outnumbered the 5 
actual practices of its implementation. The Clean Water America Alliance (2012) has categorized the 6 
main barriers to BGI implementation into four groups: Technical and Physical Barriers, Financial 7 
Barriers, Legal and Regulatory Barriers and Community and Institutional Barriers. All these barriers have 8 
a common denominator: land. Indeed, seeking to mimic pre-development hydrology usually demands 9 
more available land than grey infrastructure. This is because “making room for rivers” involves planning 10 
of submergible land which is ultimately also reserved for its ecological, social and climate mitigation 11 
function. Still the implementation of BGI is hampered by lack of available rights in land (Hartmann, 12 
2012). Tackling the issue of land scarcity for BGI calls for an analysis of the impact that BGI has on land 13 
markets, as a first step to exploring the most adequate instruments to facilitate access to land.  14 
2.2. Land markets and Blue/Green Infrastructure 15 
The link between BGI and land markets can be investigated by analysing how the later reacts to flood risk 16 
and safety and the social, ecological and economic benefits brought about by BGI, which in this paper 17 
will be referred to as improved urban quality. 18 
In terms of flood risk, attempts to establish a link between disaster risk and real estate have mostly 19 
focused on the ex-post side of the event (Jung and Yoon, 2018). In broad terms, Lamond and Proverbs 20 
(2006) describe four different scenarios of how flood risk affects property values. The first scenario refers 21 
to a low risk area, where a weather event might negatively affect property values for some time, but they 22 
bounce back soon afterward because the probability of reoccurrence is low. Second, intense weather 23 
events in disaster prone areas tend to not affect the property market substantially, since the market already 24 
reflects the risk, or because of established public compensation programs or insurance schemes. The third 25 
scenario refers to extreme weather events in areas previously considered safe, which have a considerable 26 
and long-lasting effect in the property market since the area is no longer considered safe. However, the 27 
effect of natural disasters in property market values is closely linked also to the government interventions 28 
measures. Hence, the fourth scenario shows that market prices decrease temporarily after a disaster and 29 
increase even higher than before if public funds are allocated to restore the area and protect it from future 30 
natural risks. Hence the impact that BGI have on land markets in terms of providing more flood resilient 31 
environments is hard to measure and is very context dependent. Nevertheless, the likelihood of land 32 
markets responding positively to FRM measures through BGI are higher in localities where there is a high 33 
public awareness of the prominent risk (Zhang et al., 2018). 34 
Nevertheless, BGI is expected to affect the real estate market not only by providing safer environments, 35 
but also due to its recreational and landscape advantages, contributing to higher quality of urban 36 
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environments. A study by Zhang et al. (2018) evaluates citizens’ willingness to pay for the 1 
implementation of the sponge city project (an example of making room for water) in the city of Wuhan. 2 
When asked to signal their appreciation in relation to the sponge city, provision of more green space and 3 
higher quality of public spaces were ranked of similar importance to its flood risk management role. This 4 
suggests that the impact of BGI in property values is more likely to be higher than grey infrastructure, due 5 
to its multi-functional benefits that complement its risk management role.  6 
There is a growing body of literature that reinforces the positive correlation between the quality of urban 7 
environment, referring to proximity to blue/green spaces, improved landscapes, open spaces, and property 8 
market (Zhang, Xie and Zhang, 2012; McCord et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2015; Nurmi et al., 2016). The 9 
range of this impact varies depending on the locality, the type of BGI, the type of property and other 10 
contextual factors. D’Acci’s (2019) systematization of various case studies internationally exhibit an 11 
appreciation of 5%-117% of property values as a result of proximity to green areas and 4.9%-23.1% 12 
resulting from the property overviewing a park or green space. Although these findings should not be 13 
generalized as they are very time and location bound, it is significant that more than 50 international case 14 
studies reviewed by D'Acci (2019) attest for a significant impact of blue/green and open/recreational 15 
spaces (elements which are usually present in BGI) in real estate market prices. Yet, not enough has been 16 
achieved in exploring mechanisms through which this potential economic value created by BGI 17 
implementation can be captured by public authorities to provide alternative ways of financing BGI.  18 
 19 
3. Land value capture and Flood Risk Management 20 
Whether the incremented value of land is a characteristic of ownership embedded in the realm of property 21 
rights enjoyable by the private landowner or whether it is a reflection of a wider social effort contributing 22 
to the conditions in which private property is apprehended, is still part of a polarized debate on property 23 
rights, which demands further comprehension of such rights in relation to the nature of the individual and 24 
the needs of society (Alterman, 2012).  25 
The practice on LVC is very diverse and largely depends on the political and institutional positioning of a 26 
specific locality on the spectrum of this debate. Nevertheless, experience with LVC is present not only 27 
almost everywhere geographically, but also has a long-standing history dating back to antiquity, with 28 
property tax being a very popular financial instrument in Egypt, Persia, Babylon and later on in the 29 
Roman Empire. Yet, LVC is now a generic term used to refer to almost any instrument which captures 30 
some or all ‘unearned’ increment of land value, the narrative of which has significantly shifted over time. 31 
As Alterman (2012) suggests, land value capture can refer to capturing of unearned increments that are 32 
not necessarily linked to governmental decisions, but rather reflect economic development trends (direct 33 
value capture) or capturing of betterment, where the rise in value of land is the result of: a) improved 34 
development rights resulting from planning or development-control decisions, such as land use plans, and 35 
b) improvement of infrastructure and services increasing the value of land (indirect value capture).  36 
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The table below systematizes the most popular LVC instruments and maps their implementation 1 
internationally. Given the variety of instruments and practices, and their historic implementation, this 2 
summary is by no means comprehensive, but rather a general overview of LVC and the documentation of 3 
their implementation in literature. The systematization of the LVC instruments in the table follows two 4 
criteria: the rationale behind the implementation of the instrument and the type of instrument. Following 5 
Alterman’s (2012) analyses, LVC instruments are designed based on the direct and/or indirect value 6 
capture rationale as explained above, or macro value capture which refers to instruments embedded in 7 
broader land regimes. The type of instrument used as a second criteria, refers to the nature of the 8 
instrument itself and its application. This systematization based on the existing knowledge on LVC 9 
instruments, is the first step in understanding which instruments could be more adequate in facilitating the 10 
implementation of BGI for FRM in different contexts, which is further analysed in the 'green' section of 11 
the table, which focuses only on LVC instruments that can be used for BGI. 12 
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Table 1 Summary of LVC instruments applied internationally (Source: Table compiled by author based on Harrow, 1929; Peterson, 2009; Dye and England, 2010; Rabe, 2010; 
Vetter and Vetter, 2011; Alterman, 2012; Lewis and Conaty, 2012; Smolka, 2013; Jacobus, 2015; Blanco et al., 2016; Salm, 2017) 
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The selection of the LVC instrument for further investigation in this article involved two main steps: 1 
ruling out instruments posing limitations for BGI implementation and analysing the applicability of 2 
the rest of the instruments in the BGI context. First, some of the LVC instruments, such as 3 
Cooperative Land Banking, Community Land Trusts and Land Sharing, have a very specific scope, 4 
mostly related to affordable housing (Rabé, 2010; Lewis and Conaty, 2012; Jacobus, 2015). Although 5 
BGI can be integrated in such projects as well, the main focus of these instruments does not comprise 6 
BGI. Second, instruments grouped under “Asset management” are usually implemented in contexts 7 
where public authorities own substantial amounts of land or where they have the financial capacity to 8 
access land markets. Facilitating the implementation of BGI in such contexts would be easier for 9 
obvious reasons, however this is not the case for the many countries where land tenure is dominated 10 
by private ownership or free leasehold.  11 
Therefore, the table highlights in its green section the group of LVC instruments that should have 12 
priority for further investigation as BGI facilitators. These instruments are diverse, so when 13 
considering their potential with respect to BGI, there are a few aspects to be considered: 14 
• The nexus between land value creation and value capture: The relevance with BGI is that, 15 
while some instruments are adequate to capture the value created in-site as a result of 16 
improved open spaces, landscape and overall urban quality, other instruments can be used off-17 
site, to capture part of the value incremented by virtue of increased flood resilience, which 18 
might have an impact on areas that are not necessarily in proximity to the BGI.  19 
• The context/purpose in which the instrument can be used: existing urban area, new urban 20 
development/redevelopment and for land conservation purposes. The same BGI can be 21 
facilitated through different LVC instruments; for example a raingarden can be financed 22 
through fiscal LVC, such as betterment levies, if it is implemented in an existing/consolidated 23 
urban area or it can be financed through a Land Redevelopment or Active land policy scheme, 24 
in a new urban area or urban redevelopment project.  25 
• The type of solution presented by the instrument through government approach, market 26 
approach or community approach (Crabbé and Coppens, 2019), 27 
Amongst the instruments in the green section in the table, this paper focuses on Transferable 28 
Development Rights for two main reasons: First, except from fiscal LVC instruments, TDR is the 29 
only instrument which allows for value to be captured and invested both in site and off-site, giving 30 
more flexibility in its application. Fiscal instruments which also offer this kind of flexibility have not 31 
been used for land conservation purposes so far. Which brings us to the second reason, the historic 32 
implementation of TDRs for land conservation/ environmental purposes, make this instrument 33 
attractive in terms of BGI facilitation. The numerous applications of TDR for 34 
conservation/environmental purposes, especially in the US, present great potential for further 35 
empirical research on how that experience can be adapted for BGI projects that rely on land 36 





Figure 1 Conceptual framework 2 
 3 
 4 
4. The potential for Transferable Development Rights as an instrument to make room for 5 
blue/green infrastructure 6 
4.1. How does TDR work? 7 
TDR builds on the idea that property rights exist as a separable bundle of rights, such as the right to 8 
use, to farm, to build, to mine and the like, which can be transferred and/or can be made available for 9 
market transactions (Kaplowitz, Machemer and Pruetz, 2008; Nelson, Pruetz and Woodruff, 2012). 10 
TDR focuses especially in the right to develop and considers this right transferable from designated 11 
“sending areas” to designated “receiving areas”. TDR programs operate under specific legislation, in 12 
combination with zoning and/or land use regulations that allows additional development potential in 13 
areas deemed appropriate for densification or other types of development benefits, defined as 14 
“receiving areas” (Shahab, Clinch and O’Neill, 2018). Such legislation considers the maximum 15 
carrying capacity of receiving areas, as well as mechanisms of transferring such development rights 16 
from giving areas; be it through the creation of Banks or other mechanisms. 17 
Traditionally used as an instrument to preserve heritage, farmland and environmentally sensitive 18 
areas, currently TDR practices have expanded their scope to serve various local government planning 19 
goals, such as creation of parks, BGI, scenic views and landscape preservation, trails and other 20 
community benefits (Nelson, Pruetz and Woodruff, 2012; Puertz, 2016). Landowners of the 21 
designated “sending areas” participate in the program voluntarily or compulsorily by selling their 22 
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development rights to developers in “receiving areas”, either through direct negotiation, through the 1 
mediation of the local government or through a bank. Once this is carried out, a legal instrument 2 
(conservation easement) is registered with the property deed in the giving area which permanently 3 
limits or freezes the development of land, in fulfilment to the predefined planning goals (Puertz, 4 
2016). Figure 2 shows how "sending areas" in a TDR program can contribute to land provision for 5 
BGI.  6 
 7 
Figure 2 Schematic representation of the rationale behind Transferable Development 8 
Rights Programs 9 
Although the main purpose of TDR lies on the 'giving areas', hence it focuses on the 10 
conservation/preservation aspect, TDR is classified as an LVC instrument since it balances property 11 
blight/ wipe-outs resulting from planning restrictions with windfalls, by capturing some of the value 12 
increase resulting from zoning regulations (Germán and Bernstein, 2018; Theilacker, Lotze and Loza, 13 
2019).  14 
Evidently, the motivation to participate in the program should derive from extra benefit created for 15 
developers in receiving areas, having covered the costs of participating in the TDR program and of 16 
providing bonus development (Puertz, 2016). Depending on the nature of giving areas, they can be 17 
located in close physical proximity to receiving areas, as is the case with some TDR programs aiming 18 
at historic preservation or land conservation for BGI in urban areas (Nelson, Pruetz and Woodruff, 19 
2012; City of New York - Department of City Planning, 2015), or they can be located away from 20 
receiving areas, which is usually the case with TDR programs that contribute to conservation of 21 
farmland, environmentally sensitive land or areas affected by coastal erosion (Linkous and Chapin, 22 
2014). This distinction is relevant when assessing the agents that contribute to the market potential in 23 
the receiving areas. In the first case, the quality of giving areas, especially in the case of BGI as 24 
13 
 
described in the first sections of this article (D’Acci, 2019) can contribute to the market potential of 1 
the receiving areas, reflecting in incremented land prices not only by virtue of density bonuses but 2 
also due to improved urban quality. On the other hand, this is not the case when giving and receiving 3 
areas are apart from each other, in which case, the incremented value captured in receiving areas is 4 
contributing off-site, to cover the costs of land preservation in giving areas. This distinction becomes 5 
particularly relevant when discussing matters of distributional justice in both cases, as is further 6 
discussed in the cases presented below.  7 
4.2. Facilitating Blue/green infrastructure through Transferable Development Rights 8 
Stinson (1996) suggests that amongst the main concerns that brought about TDR programs are higher 9 
demands for open spaces in congested metropolitan areas and economic incentives to develop 10 
environmentally sensitive areas. TDR addresses such pressures by reconstructing the economic 11 
incentives in land use. Up to date, more than 320 cities around the world have implemented TDR 12 
programs, 283 of which in US, while the rest in 11 other countries such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, 13 
China, France, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Spain, and the Netherlands (Puertz, 2016). More than half 14 
of these programs were designed to address environmental challenges and protect natural resources 15 
(Nelson, Pruetz and Woodruff, 2012).  16 
Although the experience with TDR programs for flood risk management is limited, such cases attest 17 
for the untapped potential of this instrument. Some coastal TDR programs, initially designed to 18 
protect the ecosystems of environmentally sensitive areas, have expanded their objectives to target 19 
adaptation to sea level rise. For instance, 13 out of 20 counties in Florida that have implemented TDR 20 
programs are coastal counties (Linkous and Chapin, 2014). Additionally, some US counties have 21 
utilized TDR programs for BGI provision. The High Line project in New York is one example of how 22 
a major BGI can be implemented through the facilitation of TDR, with receiving areas located next to 23 
the giving area. The High Line consists of a public park built on top of an abandoned elevated train 24 
line, the implementation of which was rendered possible through a TDR program, which unlocked the 25 
development rights of the giving area, namely properties underneath and immediately to the west of 26 
the high line, by encouraging their transfer to the receiving area, mostly focused on nearby Avenues 27 




Figure 3 High Line TDR Program 2 
The fast-growing region of Adams County in Colorado has approved a TDR program seeking to 3 
preserve its floodplain and habitat surrounding the South Platte River (Puertz, 2011). The six defined 4 
receiving areas are located in parts of the counted deemed suitable for hosting bonus intensities of 5 
development according to the County’s Development Standards and Regulations. Similar TDR 6 
programs aiming at tackling flood risk through land conservation and BGI have also been piloted in 7 
other areas around US such as the Hudson River Park Trust in New York  (Fenton, 2018), American 8 
Fork City TDR program in Utah, Johnson Creek Basin Plan District in Oregon, Fort Washington 9 
Office Park in Philadelphia (Puertz, 2011). So far, research on measuring the implementation and 10 




Figure 4 Adam County TDR Program (Source: Pruetz, n.d., retrieved from: 2 
www.https://smartpreservation.net/) 3 
Ultimately, the success of TDR programs relies largely on the additional profits that developers take 4 
advantage of by participating in the program in the receiving area. Henceforth, refining the calculation 5 
of the developers’ demand to exceed baseline development in receiving areas becomes central to the 6 
success of a TDR program (Puertz, 1997). In many cases, profits were linked with more square meters 7 
developed, hence the bonus units approved in receiving areas, such as in the case of Adams County 8 
(Puertz, 2011). In other cases, such as in the case of the High Line, the market potential in receiving 9 
areas is not only increased by the bonus units approved but also by their proximity to the High Line. 10 
In this sense, the impact of BGI in the market values of the nearby properties can be translated in 11 
increased potential to absorb more development right, but also in higher market values of the same 12 
development rights. Balancing windfalls on properties benefiting from the implementation of BGI 13 
with property blight of the properties whose development is limited or frozen because of the 14 
implementation of GI should be the next step of research towards new models of TDR programs.  15 
4.3. Challenges in implementing TDRs 16 
Some scepticism surrounding TDR programs rises because of concern on the bonus development 17 
rights granted in the receiving areas and how they might impact the quality of life there. It is 18 
important to bear in mind that TDR programs should not intensify development but rather redistribute 19 
according to more sustainable development models (Chiodelli and Moroni, 2016). However, in 20 
contexts where established development rights emerging from land use plans are already permissive 21 
for developers, such as the case of Flanders in Belgium, the incentive to participate in a TDR program 22 
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is low (Crabbé and Coppens, 2019), because once an area is zoned, it is difficult to reduce its 1 
development rights through downzoning (Nelson, Pruetz and Woodruff, 2012). 2 
Another challenge of managing TDR programs is that the timing of issuance of TDRs in sending 3 
areas might not coincide with the timing of TDR purchase from developers in receiving areas. This 4 
could challenge that needs to be addressed especially when it comes to BGI, where a conservation 5 
easement needs to be in place for the land preserved before work for the implementation of the BGI 6 
starts. Hence, separation of TDR extermination from acquisition has called for intermediary 7 
institutions such as development rights banks (Stinson, 1996; Puertz, 2016). 8 
Transaction costs incurred by participants of a TDR program present an additional challenge, 9 
especially since their distribution and cost per transaction might discourage landowners to participate 10 
in a TDR program. Such costs may arise from efforts to negotiate TDR sale prices, contract 11 
agreements and collecting information on potential TDR participants (buyers and sellers) (Shahab, 12 
Clinch and O’Neill, 2018). It is essential that planners account for the transaction costs when 13 
designing TDR programs and that they provide more information on TDR sale prices and potential 14 
buyers and sellers (Shahab, Clinch and O’Neill, 2018).  15 
TDR programs are an attractive LVC instrument which engages the market to balance out the costs 16 
and benefits incurring from land use planning, including policies related to integrated FRM. Such 17 
programs have been piloted in various localities in US, aiming at creating more room for water 18 
retention, by land conservation for BGI. Their success in achieving these objectives depends on the 19 
way the TDR program is designed and the context where it is implemented, as elaborated above. 20 
Nevertheless, empirical evidence regarding the success rate of TDR programs with a focus on FRM is 21 
generally lacking, and it constitutes an important field for future exploration.   22 
 23 
5. Conclusion 24 
So, what is the potential for TDR to fund BGI based flood risk management measures? This paper 25 
puts forward this question at a time when it is becoming more and more clear that flood risk 26 
management needs cannot fully be realized only through the deployment of public funds. There are 27 
several considerations to keep in mind while exploring the answer to this question. 28 
First, empirical research on the impact of BGI on land markets is still in its initial stage, however 29 
there is a large body of work assessing the effect of blue/green spaces, open spaces and improved 30 
landscapes on land markets. Indeed, such studies show that the quality of life and the quality of urban 31 
environments are becoming increasingly important factors, especially when it comes to residential 32 
areas, and they positively impact the real estate market, although the extent of this effect is very 33 
context related.  34 
Second, the implementation of Blue/green Infrastructure projects remains stubbornly slow, granted 35 
their socio-economic and ecological added value, mostly due to increased land requirements that such 36 
infrastructure poses in comparison to grey infrastructure, as well as higher maintenance costs. By 37 
17 
 
merging literature that is typically considered separately, such as literature on land markets on one 1 
hand and flood resilience on the other, this article highlights the necessity to look for solutions and 2 
lessons to be learned from Land Value Capture instruments and the vast experience in using such 3 
instruments to finance road networks, transport or other types of infrastructure. How can public 4 
authorities capitalize on the added value of BGI, in terms of increase of rental values in the land 5 
market, to finance such infrastructure? This research seeks to initiate this conversation by 6 
systematizing the experience and body of knowledge on Land Value Capture instruments (Table 1), as 7 
a way to accentuate the need for further investigation in the field. The variety and degree of success of 8 
Land Value Capture instruments is diverse, and as such, it is important to carefully consider each 9 
instrument in the realm of a given context and evaluate its potential to facilitate Blue/green 10 
Infrastructure provision.  11 
Transferable Development Rights, an LVC instrument with an emphasis on land conservation, can be 12 
an attractive instrument in terms of cross-subsidizing property windfalls of the properties benefiting 13 
from Blue/green Infrastructure and property blights of the landowners in properties where 14 
development shall be frozen to provide Blue/green Infrastructure. TDR requires attractive land 15 
markets to subsidize land conservation and perpetually freeze development for BGI provision. The 16 
positive impact that BGI has on land markets of the beneficial areas presents an incentive for such 17 
areas to be designated as receiving areas. Receiving areas can be designated to host additional 18 
development rights, should the carrying capacity of the area allow to do so. However, it is important 19 
to estimate the amount of additional development rights and their value and to balance them with the 20 
development rights to be transferred from the giving area. For the most part, this is one of the main 21 
reasons why some TDR programs fail.  22 
Nevertheless, Transferable Development Rights programs operate within specific legal contexts, in 23 
which the Right to develop is part of the bundle of rights of property and is separable and 24 
transferrable. Without such legal embedding and without approaching development rights as a social 25 
construct, granted from the society to the individual landowner, the implementation of TDR for any 26 
purpose would be difficult, if possible, at all. Therefore, while TDR has the potential to be 27 
implemented for land provision scoping to mainstream Blue/green Infrastructure, further research 28 
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